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The Excess Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates:  





This paper demonstrates that long-term forward interest rates in the U.S. often react 
considerably to surprises in macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy 
announcements.  This behavior is in contrast to the prediction of many macroeconomic 
models, in which the long-run properties of the economy are assumed to be time-
invariant and perfectly known by all economic agents: Under those assumptions, the 
shocks we consider would have only transitory effects on short-term interest rates, and 
hence would not generate large responses in forward rates.  Our empirical findings 
suggest that private agents adjust their expectations of the long-run inflation rate in 
response to macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises.  We present an alternative 
model that captures this behavior.  Consistent with our hypothesis, forward rates derived 
from inflation-indexed Treasury debt show little sensitivity to these shocks, indicating 
that the response of nominal forward rates is mostly driven by inflation compensation.  In 
addition, we find that in the U.K., where the long-run inflation target is known by the 
private sector, long-term forward rates have demonstrated little excess sensitivity since 
the Bank of England achieved independence in mid-1997. 
  3
1.  Introduction 
 
Current macroeconomic models provide appealing, succinct descriptions of business 
cycle dynamics in the U.S. and other countries, but less is known about the extent to 
which these models accurately replicate the economy’s long-run characteristics.  In part, 
this reflects the fact that economists have fewer observations about long-run behavior, 
given the limited sample sizes available.  But while less is known about the long-run 
characteristics of the economy, many macroeconomic models impose very strong 
assumptions about this behavior—that the long-run levels of inflation and the real interest 
rate are constant over time and perfectly known by all economic agents.  This paper 
concentrates on the validity of those assumptions. 
 
More specifically, we focus on the effects of macroeconomic and monetary policy 
surprises on the term structure of interest rates.  In standard macroeconomic models, 
short-term interest rates tend to return relatively quickly to a deterministic steady state 
after a macroeconomic or monetary policy shock, so that these shocks have only 
transitory effects on the future path of interest rates.  As a result, one would expect only a 
limited response of long-term interest rates to these disturbances.  Putting this prediction 
in terms of forward rates, one would expect virtually no reaction of long-term forward 
rates to these shocks. 
 
However, the behavior of the U.S. Treasury market appears to contrast significantly with 
these predictions.  In particular, we demonstrate that long-term forward rates have a 
tendency to move significantly in response to the unexpected components of monetary 
policy decisions and a number of macroeconomic data releases, which we refer to as 
excess sensitivity. 
 
The paper then turns to potential explanations for this behavior.  We find that time-
varying term premia are unlikely to be an adequate explanation, given that we observe 
excess sensitivity of long rates following a variety of shocks that one would expect to 
have different implications for the term premium.  We interpret our findings as instead  4
indicating that an assumption made in these models—that the long-run expectations of 
economic agents are precise and time-invariant—is violated.  In particular, our empirical 
results are all consistent with a model that we present in which private agents’ views of 
long-run inflation are not strongly anchored. 
 
We bring additional empirical evidence to bear on our hypothesis from two sources.  
First, we look at real forward interest rates computed from inflation-indexed U.S. 
Treasury debt.  We find that those rates generally do not respond to macroeconomic and 
monetary policy surprises, which indicates that the excess sensitivity of nominal forward 
rates derives from their compensation for expected inflation.  Second, we investigate 
whether excess sensitivity is also observed in the U.K., where the long-run inflation 
target is known by the private sector.  We find that long-term forward rates in the U.K. 
responded significantly to some macroeconomic news prior to mid-1997, but that this 
responsiveness has largely disappeared since the Bank of England gained independence, 
perhaps because its explicit long-run inflation target became more credible. 
  
 
2.  Long-run Implications of Macroeconomic Models 
 
Standard macroeconomic models assume that the long-run characteristics of the 
economy, such as the levels of inflation and the real interest rate, are constant over time 
and perfectly known by all economic agents.  An implication of this assumption is that, 
after a macroeconomic or monetary policy shock, expectations of short-term nominal 
interest rates far enough in the future should remain relatively fixed. 
 
This effect is illustrated in Figure 1, which plots impulse response functions for short-
term nominal interest rates from two standard macroeconomic models:  the “New 
Keynesian” model (taken from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) and depicted by the solid 
lines) and, since the New Keynesian model has often been criticized for its inability to 
generate appreciable inflation persistence (Estrella and Fuhrer (2002)), a modification of  5
the model that allows for a significant fraction of “backward-looking” or “rule of thumb” 
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where  denotes the inflation rate, y the output gap, i the short-term nominal interest rate, 
and 
 and 
y are i.i.d. shocks.
1  The parameter  denotes the degree of forward-looking 
behavior in the model, and the lag polynomials A(L) and Ay(L) summarize the 
parameters governing the dynamics of any backward-looking components of the model. 
 
In the analysis that follows, we will consider two variants of the model that differ in the 
degree of forward-looking behavior.  In the first case, we assume that agents are 
completely forward-looking, or =1, as in the standard New Keynesian model.  For that 
model, we take the parameter values for these equations from Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 
(2001).  However, much smaller values of  (around 0.3) have been estimated and 
advocated by Fuhrer (1997), Roberts (1998), and Rudebusch (2001) to match the degree 
of persistence in U.S. data.  Thus, we consider a second case in which =0.3 due to 
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1 These variables are all normalized to have steady state values of zero.  We consider extending the model 
with persistent shocks in section 4, below. 
2 Rudebusch estimates a value of =0.29.  There are also some minor technical differences between 
equations (2.1)-(2.2) and the specification of Rudebusch’s model .  To generate the impulse response 
functions in Figure 1, we use the model exactly as specified in Rudebusch (2001), but these differences in 
specification have no discernible effect on our results.  6
where   denotes the trailing four-quarter moving average of inflation, and a, b, and c are 
the parameters of the rule.
3  Note that the policy rule is both “backward-looking,” in that 
the rate responds to current values of the output gap and inflation rather than their 
forecasts, and “inertial,” in that it includes the lagged federal funds rate.  Both of these 
characteristics tend to add inertia to the short rate, which generally gives these models the 
best possible chance to explain the term structure evidence we find below.  We include an 
interest rate shock, 
i
t  , for the purpose of generating impulse response functions, below. 
  
The three panels of Figure 1 show the response of the short-term nominal interest rate to 
a one-percent shock to the inflation equation, the output equation, and the interest rate 
equation, respectively, under our two baseline models.  In all of the panels of the figure, 
the effects of the macroeconomic and monetary policy shocks on interest rates die out 
quite quickly, generally within just a few years.  After 10 years have passed, short-term 
interest rates have in all cases essentially returned to their steady-state level.  We now 
turn to how well these predictions are matched by the data. 
 
  
3.  The Excess Sensitivity of Long-term Interest Rates 
The previous section demonstrated that under some common macroeconomic models that 
assume a constant steady state, the reaction of the short-term interest rate to various 
macroeconomic shocks tends to die out within a few years.  As a result, expectations of 
short-term interest rates at horizons beyond several years should be well anchored.  This 
section investigates whether this prediction is consistent with the behavior of the term 
structure of interest rates. 
 
It is perhaps easiest to think of the term structure implications of the models in terms of 
forward rates rather than yields.  Forward rates are simply a different way of expressing 
the yield curve.  A yield represents the return that an investor demands to lend money 
today in return for a single payment in the future (in the case of a zero-coupon bond).  A 
                                                 
3 We use the values of a, b, and c estimated by Rudebusch (2002) for the period 1987Q4 to 1999Q4.  These 
are:  a=.53, b=.93, and c=.73.  7
forward rate instead represents the rate of return that an investor would demand today to 
commit to lending money, say, nine years ahead for a payment ten years ahead.  The 
linkage between these concepts is simple: a ten-year zero-coupon security can be thought 
of as a string of forward rate agreements to lend money for one-year periods today, in one 
year, in two years, and so on up to nine years.  Formally, the continuously-compounded 
yield on a zero-coupon security with a maturity of m years, yt(m), can be written as an 
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where ft(i,1) is the forward rate at time t for a one-year period ending i years ahead.   
If we observed zero-coupon market yields at all maturities, those yields could be 
equivalently expressed by the forward rates that they imply.  In practice, however, 
Treasury notes and bonds have coupon payments and somewhat irregular maturity dates.  
Thus, we estimate a smoothed zero-coupon yield curve using the method of Svensson 
(1994) and calculate the forward rates implied from the smoothed curve.
4 
 
3.1  The Excess Volatility of Forward Rates 
The advantage of using forward rates is that they serve as a proxy for expectations of 
future values of the short-term interest rate, up to a term premium.  If the term premium 
is relatively stable over time, the models from the previous section indicate that long-term 
forward rates should be well anchored.  This is demonstrated in Figure 2, which shows 
the standard deviation of forward rates at various horizons from simulations of the 
Rudebusch model, under the assumption that term premia are constant.  The volatility 
term structure is strongly downward sloping in the horizon of the forward rate.
5  The 
                                                 
4 Below, we show that our results are robust to computing forward rates directly from Treasury STRIPS 
data.  The Svensson zero-coupon curve is estimated through off-the-run Treasury notes and bonds. 
5 Rudebusch calibrates the variances of the disturbances to the model from the observed behavior of 
inflation and the output gap since 1968.  This helps explain why the volatility term structure from the 
simulated model begins well above the realized volatility, which is calculated since 1990.  We assume that 
there are no monetary policy shocks when computing the model’s predictions, but including such shocks 
has no effect on the qualitative nature of the figure.    8
volatility term structure from the CGG model would decline even more sharply, given the 
limited dynamics of the interest rate shown in Figure 1.
6 
By contrast, the observed term structure of volatility barely slopes down at all, and the 
volatility of forward rates remains considerable even at very long horizons.
7  Thus, there 
is a considerable discrepancy between the models and the term structure evidence.  This 
finding is related to a well-known puzzle—that long-term interest rates seem surprisingly 
volatile, which we will refer to as the excess volatility puzzle.  Indeed, Shiller (1979) first 
showed that long-term interest rates are substantially more volatile than one would expect 
given the subsequent realizations of short-term interest rates and a constant risk premium.  
Our results show the same finding in terms of forward rates, only where expectations of 
future interest rates are derived from an assumed class of models.
8 
 
Of course, the greater-than-expected volatility of long-term forward rates in the data 
could be explained by time-varying term premia on those instruments.  Indeed, there is no 
reason to expect term premia to be constant over time.  Once the assumption of a constant 
risk premium at each maturity is relaxed, one could perfectly replicate the observed term 
structure of volatility by assuming a random term premium of an appropriate magnitude.   
 
However, we present additional evidence about the volatility of long-term forward rates 
that cannot be explained by simply adding a time-varying term premium to the model.  In 
particular, we demonstrate that the excess volatility of long-term forward rates in part 
arises from their systematic responses to surprises in a variety of macroeconomic data 
releases and monetary policy announcements.  We refer to this behavior as the excess 
sensitivity puzzle. 
 
In establishing the empirical evidence, our intention is to condition on events that would, 
under the macroeconomic models described above, be perceived as having transitory 
                                                 
6 We do not currently show the results from simulating the CGG model because they do not report 
variances for the shocks to their model. 
7 For comparability to the model, the Treasury data are sampled at quarterly frequency over our sample 
(1990-2002) and the standard deviation of the 1-year forward rate at each horizon is plotted. 
8 This finding is also consistent with the importance of the “level” factor in explaining yield curve 
movements in the finance literature (Knez, Litterman, and Scheinkman, 1991).  9
implications for the path of short-term interest rates.  The remainder of this section 
focuses only on quantifying the reaction of the yield curve to these shocks.  In section 4, 
we will discuss possible explanations for our findings and the implications of our results 
for macroeconomic models. 
 
3.2.  The Excess Sensitivity of Long-term Interest Rates to Macroeconomic News 
We begin our analysis by looking at the response of the term structure to macroeconomic 
data releases.  We have collected data on the released values of 39 different 
macroeconomic statistics going as far back as 1990.  In the regressions below, we 
estimate the market reaction to the surprise component of these releases. 
 
To measure market expectations for each macroeconomic data release, we use the median 
market forecast as compiled and published by Money Market Services the Friday before 
each release.  The sample over which the MMS data are available to us varies across the 
individual releases.  The surprise component of each data release is computed as the 
actual released value minus the market expectation.  These surprises have zero means, as 
expected. 
 
In the analysis that follows, we regress daily changes in the one-year forward rate at each 
horizon on a constant and all of the macroeconomic surprises.
9  This approach has the 
advantage of capturing the effects of all data releases in a single regression, which will 
properly parse out the response of the forward rate when there are multiple releases on a 
given day.  The sample used runs from January 1990 through July 2002. 
 
We select the variables to include in the regression based on their significance in 
determining the forward rate ending one-year ahead (which is equivalent to the one-year 
yield).  More specifically, we estimate the regression for that variable using all 39 data 
                                                 
9 Note that for any given macroeconomic statistic, the time series of surprises is mostly zeros, since each 
statistic is typically only released once per month (or in some cases once per quarter).  10
surprises, drop the least significant one, and iterate in this manner until all the remaining 
variables are significant at the 10% level.
10   
 
The results are reported in Table 1.
11  The effects of the macroeconomic surprises on the 
one-year yield all have the sign one would expect.  When releases that are procyclical 
(like retail sales) have a higher realized value than expected, the short-term interest rate 
increases; similarly, when countercyclical indicators, like initial claims, turn out to be 
higher than expected, the one-year yield responds negatively.  Similarly, news that more 
directly pertains to near-term inflation, such as the CPI release, generates an interest rate 
response in the same direction. 
 
Of greater relevance to the current paper, though, is the fact that many of these variables 
also have a significant impact on one-year forward rates ending five and even ten years 
ahead.  Twelve of the variables enter the regressions with significant coefficients (at the 
10% level) for the five-year-ahead forward interest rate, and 10 variables enter 
significantly for the ten-year-ahead forward interest rate.  This excess sensitivity of long 
rates is present both for indicators of inflation and factor costs (e.g., the core PPI and 
Employment Cost Index) and for indicators of output (e.g., GDP, Nonfarm Payrolls, 
Retail Sales).  Moreover, in many cases the response of the long-term forward interest 
rate is only modestly smaller than the response of the spot one-year rate. 
 
In Figure 3, we present the same results graphically for nine of the most interesting 
macroeconomic data releases.  In each panel of the figure, we plot the regression 
coefficients for the response of the one-year forward rate at each horizon from zero to 
fourteen years ahead, together with 95% standard error bands around that estimate.  The 
persistence of the effects of many of these announcements on forward interest rates is 
remarkable, going out even 15 years in many cases. 
 
                                                 
10 We also include core PPI, which seems to matter at longer horizons.  
11 The units of the dependent variable (basis points) and independent variables usually do not match and 
this leads to some very small coefficient estimates.    11
This excess sensitivity is at odds with the predictions of the macroeconomic models 
considered above.  Each of the data surprises included in the regressions presumably 
reflects some combination of the macroeconomic disturbances from that model.  Thus, if 
one does not expect to find a sizable response of long-term interest rates to the model’s 
shocks 
   and 
y  , then one would not expect to find such a response to the news 
releases either.   
 
Moreover, it should be emphasized that even though some of these statistics might be 
regarded as nonstationary (e.g., Nonfarm Payrolls or Retail Sales), their effect on interest 
rates in standard macroeconomic models should not be.  Standard models express interest 
rates as a function of the output gap, rather than the level of output, and the former 
variable is typically regarded as stationary even though the latter may not be.  Thus, a 
given shock to output may have permanent implications for the level of output, but the 
predicted effects for the output gap and interest rates will typically only be transitory.  A 
similar observation can be made with respect to inflation—even though there is some 
evidence that inflation was nonstationary in the 1970s and early 1980s, so long as 
monetary policy follows the “Taylor principle” (raising real interest rates in response to 
an increase in inflation), both inflation and nominal interest rates will be mean-reverting 
in standard models.  Empirical estimates of monetary policy reaction functions for the 
U.S. (e.g., Taylor (1993) and CGG (2000)) indicate that the Fed has followed the “Taylor 
principle” over our sample, and thus we should generally observe short-term nominal 
interest rates returning to steady state in response to inflation shocks. 
 
3.3.  The Excess Sensitivity of Long-term Interest Rates to Monetary Policy Surprises 
 
The preceding section demonstrated that long-term forward interest rates tend to track the 
short-term interest rate in response to disturbances that the models above would consider 
transitory.  Macroeconomic data releases are important for interest rates presumably 
because they contain information about the future course of monetary policy.  We next 
turn our attention to the most important data release for expectations of near-term 
monetary policy:  FOMC announcements.  12
 
Unlike the other macroeconomic data releases we consider, we do not use survey 
measures of expectation about upcoming monetary policy decisions.  Instead, we use 
prices of federal funds futures contracts, which provide a virtually continuous, market-
based measure of these expectations, as noted by Krueger and Kuttner (1996), Rudebusch 
(1998), and Brunner (2000).
12  The federal funds futures contract for a given month has a 
payout based on the average effective federal funds rate during that month, so that daily 
changes reflect revisions to the federal funds rate expected to prevail over the remainder 
of the month.  Thus, as explained in Kuttner (2001), the change in the current month’s 
contract rate on the day of the FOMC meeting (or inter-meeting policy actions) can be 
used to calculate the unexpected component of policy actions, as follows:
13 
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where d is the day of the FOMC meeting during the month, D is the total number of days 
in the month, and ff1 is the change in the rate on the current month’s federal funds 
futures contract. 
 
We compute the monetary policy shocks for all FOMC meetings and inter-meeting policy 
actions since 1990.  One small complication arises in the timing of the shocks.  Since 
1994, the FOMC has explicitly announced its target for the federal funds rate on the 
afternoon of the FOMC meeting.  Prior to 1994, the announcement of the target rate to 
the market was not explicit, but was effectively made through the size and type of open 
market operation the following morning.  We take this change in timing into account in 
computing our monetary policy surprises.
 14 
                                                 
12 Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2002) find that among many financial market instruments that 
potentially reflect expectations of monetary policy, federal funds futures are the best predictor of future 
policy actions.  
13 Our measure of monetary policy surprises differs slightly from Kuttner’s, in that we look at the next 
month’s contract if an FOMC meeting takes place in the last seven days of a month, whereas Kuttner does 
this only if the meeting takes place in the last three days. 
14 There is an additional complication in that changes in the discount rate were always announced by the 
FOMC on the afternoon of the FOMC meeting.  Thus, when a change in the discount rate was  13
 
Having computed our monetary policy surprise series, we regress the daily change in 
forward interest rates around each FOMC announcement on the monetary policy surprise.  
Figure 4 presents the estimated response coefficients of one-year forward rates ending 
one to 15 years ahead, along with 95% confidence bands. 
 
As expected, forward rates at the short end of the yield curve increase following a 
surprise tightening of the federal funds rate (and decrease following a surprise easing).  
Given that the federal funds rate typically has some persistence, as noted by many 
authors, tighter policy today leads to expectations that the federal funds rate will remain 
higher in the near future, thus pushing near-term forward rates in the same direction as 
the policy surprise. 
 
However, at longer horizons, one-year forward rates actually move in the direction 
opposite to that of the policy surprise.  The effect is statistically significant and long-
lasting, going out as far as 15 years.  Figure 6 illustrates this effect in a different way by 
plotting the change in the one-year forward rate ten years ahead against the surprise 
component of the monetary policy announcement. 
 
The regression equation corresponding to Figure 5 is:
15 
 
∆10yrfwd   =   –0.01  –  0.15*surprise,   
       (0.01)   (0.08)     R
2 = 0.06  N = 113 
 
where heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are reported in parentheses.  The 
coefficient on the monetary policy surprise is significant at the 10% level.  Moreover, this 
finding seems to have strengthened in more recent samples.  Indeed, repeating this 
                                                                                                                                                 
implemented, we assume that markets (correctly) also inferred that the target federal funds rate had 
changed as well. 
15 Regressions for the 1990-2002 and 1994-2002 samples are insensitive to removal of outliers, excluding 
intermeeting moves and using only dates with policy changes.  The September 17, 2002 intermeeting 
easing is excluded from all samples as markets lacked the liquidity to be efficient indicators of policy 
expectations around this date.    14
regression exercise for the 1994-2002 sample, when our measure of the monetary policy 
surprise is arguably more accurate, yields the estimates: 
 
∆10yrfwd   =   –0.00  –  0.23*surprise.   
       (0.01)   (0.10)     R
2 = 0.12  N = 72 
 
For this later sample, the regression coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
 
The finding that long-term forward rates move in the opposite direction of monetary 
policy surprises is not widely recognized in the literature.  For example, Romer and 
Romer (2000) and Cook and Hahn (1989) come to the conclusion that “when the Federal 
Reserve undertakes contractionary open market operations, interest rates for securities of 
all maturities typically rise” (Romer and Romer, p. 429).  The primary difference 
between their analysis and ours is that they consider long-term yields, and not long-term 
forward rates.  It should also be noted that these earlier authors’ measures of monetary 
policy surprises suffer from measurement error, since they use only the raw change in the 
federal funds target rate, effectively treating each policy action by the FOMC as being 
completely unexpected by the markets.  Kuttner (2001) shows that, not surprisingly, it is 
the unexpected component of FOMC policy actions that are related to term structure 
movements, rather than the raw policy actions themselves. 
 
As with the macroeconomic surprises, our finding is inconsistent with the economic 
models considered above, which would view monetary policy shocks (corresponding to 
the shock term  from the model) as transitory movements away from the steady state 
that would warrant no response of long-term forward rates.  The fact that monetary policy 
shocks generate a reaction of forward rates in the opposite direction of the short-term 
rate—in contrast to the patterns observed in response to all macroeconomic shocks—
provides an important clue about the source of the shocks.  However, before turning to 
possible explanations for our empirical findings in the next section, we will first check 
the robustness of the findings to an alternative method for computing forward rates. 
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3.4  Robustness Check:  STRIPS-based Forward Rates 
 
Forward rates can only be calculated from the yields (or prices) of zero-coupon securities.   
Thus, to compute the forward rates used above, we make use of a smoothed zero-coupon 
yield curve estimated from the prices of Treasury notes and bonds.  However, it is 
conceivable that the smoothing involved in fitting the yield curve forces a relationship 
between short-term and long-term interest rates, thereby leading to a spurious finding of 
excess sensitivity of long forward rates.   
 
To make sure that this is not the case, we repeat our analysis using forward rates derived 
from Treasury STRIPS.  STRIPS are zero-coupon securities created from the individual 
payments on Treasury notes and bonds that trade in the market like other Treasury 
securities.
16  By relying on STRIPS, we can obtain a purely market-based reading of 
forward rates that does not require any smoothing.   
 
More specifically, we compute the forward rates from the coupon STRIPS with 
maturities that are one year apart and that most closely span the period covered by the 
forward rate.
17  As above, we consider the one-year forward rates ending in five and ten 
years, but omit the forward rate ending in one year because of a lack of data.  The sample 
here begins in 1994, when reliable STRIPS data are first available to us.   
 
Repeating the analysis from above, we once again find that these long-term forward rates 
react significantly to many of the macroeconomic data releases, as reported in Table 2 
(which is analogous to Table 1).  As can be seen, 12 of the 19 macroeconomic surprises 
affect five-year ahead forward rates, and 7 variables affect ten-year forward rates 
significantly.  The magnitudes are once again comparable to magnitudes reported in 
Table 1. 
 
                                                 
16 See Sack (2000) for more details on Treasury STRIPS and their potential use in estimating the Treasury 
yield curve. 
17 The downside of this approach is that STRIPS at some maturities are less liquid than Treasury notes and 
bonds.  As a result, the yields on those securities might have some idiosyncratic variation, which imparts 
some noise into the STRIPS-based forward rates.  16
Moreover, when we look at the response of the ten-year-ahead STRIPS-based forward 
rate to monetary policy surprises, we once again find a negative relationship: 
 
∆10yrfwd=  -0.01  + -0.33*surprise   
        (0.01)     (0.08)      R2= 0.22  N= 69. 
 
The coefficient is comparable in magnitude to that found above for the 1994-2002 sample 
period, and the coefficient is now significant at one percent. 
 
Overall, then, the finding that long-term forward rates demonstrate excess sensitivity to 
the various disturbances considered in this section appears to be robust.  We now turn to 
potential explanations of this behavior. 
 
 
4.  Possible Explanations for the Behavior of Long-term Interest Rates 
 
In steady state, the short-term nominal interest rate i equals the steady-state real interest 
rate r* plus the steady-state level of inflation *, by Fisher’s equation: 
 
* * *    r i     (4.1) 
 
As mentioned above, standard asset-pricing theory indicates that forward rates with 
sufficiently long horizons (i.e., ) 1 , (N ft  for N large) equal the expected steady-state short-
term rate plus a risk premium : 
 
     * * ) 1 , ( r N ft      (4.2) 
 
The fact that  ) 1 , (N ft responds to many macroeconomic data releases and monetary policy 
surprises seems to indicate that one (or more) of r*, *, and  is changing in response to 
these surprises. 
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4.1.  Some Non-explanations for the Excess Sensitivity Puzzle 
4.1.1.  Persistent Transitory Shocks 
Of course, one could argue that the five- to 15-year horizon that we consider in our 
empirical analysis is simply not long enough for short-term interest rates in the U.S. to 
return to their steady-state levels.  The problem with this explanation is that realistic 
calibrations of macroeconomic models to the data typically imply that interest rates return 
to steady state within just a few years, typically much fewer than the 10-year lag that 
would be required to support this explanation. 
 
In section 2, we presented interest rate impulse response functions from two baseline 
macroeconomic models as examples.  We now try increasing the persistence in these 
models by raising the persistence of the exogenous driving shocks as a robustness check.  
Figure 6 presents the results.  In both models, we assume that the exogenous shocks to 
the inflation and output gap equations have an AR(1) persistence coefficient of 0.8, 
implying that these shocks have a half-life of about 3 quarters (above and beyond any 
endogenous persistence that is generated by the dynamics of the model).  In both cases, 
the effects of shocks to the model on interest rates continue to die out well within 10 
years. 
 
In order to generate persistence in these models sufficient to account for the excess 
sensitivity of long-term interest rates that we see in the data, we would require AR(1) 
coefficients on inflation and output gap shocks of about 0.95, implying a half-life for 
these exogenous shocks of over 13 quarters, or more than 3 years (remember that this 
does not include any endogenous persistence generated by the model!).  Even then, we 
would not be able to account for the excess sensitivity of long-term interest rates to 
monetary policy announcements without assuming a similarly large persistence of 
exogenous shocks to the short-term interest rate.  We view such a high degree of shock 
persistence in these models as empirically implausible and theoretically unfounded. 
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4.1.2.  Changes in Risk Premia  
One might accept our hypothesis that one or more of r*, *, and/or  is changing in 
response to macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises, but argue that changes in the 
risk premium  are the most likely explanation.  Indeed, this explanation is often offered 
as a possible factor in the failure of the expectations hypothesis at longer maturities and 
as an explanation for the excess volatility puzzle. 
 
However, it is difficult to reconcile changes in risk premia with the wide variety of 
shocks that induce excess sensitivity.  Consider, for example, a utility-based model in 
which the risk premium is determined by the correlation of the asset return with the 
marginal utility of consumption.  Such a model would presumably have difficulty 
explaining why long-horizon forward rates move in the same direction as short-term rates 
in response to both GDP and CPI shocks, even though we would think of these shocks as 
having very different implications for the path of consumption.  Moreover, to match our 
empirical results, one must also explain why the long-term forward rate moves in the 
opposite direction of the short-term rate in response to monetary policy surprises. 
 
Alternatively, the shocks considered could influence the risk premium by affecting the 
amount of uncertainty going forward.  Here, the effect could go either way:  On the one 
hand, the release of macroeconomic news might resolve some uncertainty about 
macroeconomic conditions; on the other hand, if the volatility of economic shocks has 
some serial correlation, then a large surprise today might portend additional large shocks 
in the future, thus increasing uncertainty.  In either case, though, one would expect the 
impact on the risk premium to depend only on the magnitude of the shock, and not its 
sign.  By contrast, to explain our empirical results, the response of the risk premium 
would have to depend on the sign of the shock. 
 
4.1.3.  Changes in r* 
 
Alternatively, one might argue that changes in r* are the most likely explanation.  The 
problem with this argument is that the interest rate responses to some of the surprises that  19
we consider do not seem to have the predicted sign that a change in the long-run 
equilibrium real rate of interest would require.  For example, it is hard to explain why a 
surprise uptick in inflation (the CPI or PPI) would lead the market to revise upward its 
estimate of r*, the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest.  Along the same lines, it is 
difficult to explain why a surprise monetary policy tightening would lead the market to 
revise downward its estimate of r*—presumably a surprise tightening of policy, to the 
extent that it provides any information about r*,  indicates that the FOMC views r* as 
being higher than the market estimate. 
 
This is not to say that changes in the market’s perception of r* are necessarily 
unimportant.  Indeed, it is possible that changes in r* account for a significant fraction of 
the long-run forward rate response to output surprises, particularly in the late 1990s, 
when market estimates of the long-run rate of productivity growth in the U.S. were 
largely in flux.  Relying solely on changes in r* to explain our empirical results, however, 
is likely to run into difficulties along the dimensions we have described above. 
 
4.2.  A Possible Explanation for Excess Sensitivity:  Changes in * 
 
While we do not wish to overly discount the importance of the above explanations, we 
find each of them inadequate on its own to explain all of our empirical results.  However, 
there is one explanation that is potentially consistent with all of our empirical findings:  
changes in the market’s perception of *, the long-run level of inflation. 
 
We can demonstrate this in the baseline models from section 2 by augmenting the models 
to include an additional equation that permits the long-run level of inflation, *, to vary 
over time.  We do not take a stand on why this might be so:  for instance, it may be that, 
after a shock, the central bank views the costs of driving inflation t all the way back to 
its original * as being larger than the benefits.  Alternatively, it may be that private 
agents’ long-run expectations of inflation * tend to drift over time, and the central bank 
is simply maximizing the welfare of its citizens.  Regardless of the source of the variation  20
in *, we consider a specification in which the central bank’s long-run target for inflation 
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where  1  t   is the trailing four-quarter moving average of inflation.  Thus, low inflation 
will, after a while, tend to decrease the central bank’s long-run inflation target. 
 
Moreover, we assume that the central bank’s inflation target * is not directly observed 
by the private sector, and thus must be inferred by agents on the basis of the central 
bank’s actions, as in Kozicki and Tinsley (2001), Ellingsen and Soderstrom (2002), and 
Erceg and Levin (forthcoming).  This allows the model to capture the possibility that a 
surprise monetary tightening may indicate to agents that the central bank’s long-run 
target for inflation has fallen.  Exogenous changes in the central bank’s inflation target * 
are captured by the shock 
*  t . 
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The variable 
* ˆt   denotes private agents’ estimate of the central bank’s inflation target, 
and the parameter  denotes the private sector’s Kalman gain on deviations of the interest 
rate from agents’ expectation based on their prior estimate of *.  For simplicity and 
tractability, we assume that all features of the model other than * (the forms of  21
equations (4.4) through (4.8), all parameter values, and all shocks other than 
*    and 
i  ) 
are perfectly known by the private sector. 
 
Figure 7 presents impulse response functions for the time-varying * version of our 
baseline models to each of the shocks  in equations (4.4) through (4.7).  We present first 
the results from the partially backward-looking Rudebusch model.  Parameter values are 
the same as in section 2, and we set =0.02, =0.1 to calibrate our impulse response 
functions roughly to the data.  Each column of Figure 7 presents the impulse responses of 
inflation, the output gap, the short-term interest rate, the central bank’s long-run inflation 
target *, and the private sector’s estimate of *, respectively, to a given shock.  The first 
column presents the responses to a one-percent shock to the inflation equation (
  ), the 
second column the responses to a one-percent shock to the output gap equation (
y  ), and 
so on. 
 
The qualitative features of our empirical findings are reproduced very nicely.  For 
example, after an inflation shock, the short-term nominal interest rate rises gradually, 
peaks after a few years, and then returns to a long-run steady-state level that is about 35 
basis points higher than the original steady state.  This is due to the fact that the higher 
levels of inflation on the transition path lead the central bank’s long-run target * to rise 
somewhat as a result.  A similar response of short-term nominal interest rates and 
inflation can be seen in response to a one-percent shock to output. 
 
For the federal funds rate shock, two effects are present.  First, when the private sector 
sees the surprise tightening in short-term interest rates, they respond by partially revising 
downward their estimate of the central bank’s target *.  Second, as inflation in the 
economy falls in response to both the monetary tightening and the fall in expectations of 
inflation, the central bank’s long-run target * begins to fall as well.  In the long run, the 
short-term nominal interest rate and inflation return to lower levels than where they 
began. 
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Finally, in response to a direct, exogenous shock to the central bank’s long-run target * 
(depicted in the fourth column as an exogenous one-percent reduction in the central 
bank’s inflation target), the private sector gradually revises its estimate of the central 
bank’s inflation target downward.  In the end, inflation and the short-term nominal 
interest rate are significantly lower than their original steady-state values. 
 
Note that learning and imperfect information about the central bank’s target, *, play a 
role only in the third and fourth columns of the figure, and not in the first two columns.  
Thus, a model based solely on learning or “imperfect credibility” (as in Kozicki and 
Tinsley (2001) or Erceg and Levin (forthcoming)) would not be able to reproduce our 
findings of excess sensitivity of long-term rates in response to output and inflation 
surprises. 
 
For completeness, we have also included the analogous set of impulse response functions 
for the CGG model in Figure 7 (on the following page).  The predictions of the CGG 
model are qualitatively similar to those of the Rudebusch model, though the CGG model 
fits the short-run dynamics of the data less well (in fact, we have included the AR(1) 
persistence coefficient of 0.8 for the inflation and output shocks in this version of the 
model, to better match these short-run aspects of the data).  Note that, because the 
impulse response functions for inflation are less persistent for this model than in the 
Rudebusch version, we require a higher value of  to match the data; in the figure 
presented here, we use a value of =0.1, which is five times higher than the value we 
used in the more inertial Rudebusch model. 
 
In sum, our empirical observations all seem to be consistent with a simple modification 
of our baseline models to allow for time-varying long-run inflation expectations *.  We 





5.  Evidence from Treasury Inflation-Indexed Debt 
 
The hypothesis that movements in long-term forward rates are driven primarily by 
expected inflation and not expected real interest rates could be tested directly if a market-
based measure of real interest rates were available.  An obvious source of such a measure 
is the market for Treasury inflation-indexed securities, which are commonly referred to 
as TIPS.  Because its coupon and principal payments increase in line with CPI inflation, 
the quoted yields on TIPS approximately represent the real return that the investor would 
realize from holding the security to maturity.  Hence, those yields can be used to compute 
real forward rates, or the real rate of return that an investor can lock in today for some 
future period. 
 
A complication arises because there are not enough securities to estimate a reliable zero-
coupon yield curve for TIPS.  In the following results, we use an approximation to 
compute one-year real forward rates using the two most recently issued ten-year TIPS.  In 
particular, we assume that the yields on those two securities are approximately equal to 
the yields that investors would demand for zero-coupon inflation-indexed securities with 
the same duration as the TIPS.  In that case, we can compute the real one-year forward 
rate ending at the duration of the most-recently-issued ten-year TIPS.   
 
Because such securities are typically issued only once a year, the horizon covered by the 
real forward rate varies over time.  That is, it is at its longest when a new security is 
issued, and it narrows by a year until just before a new security is issued.  In order to 
make comparisons of the real forward rate to its nominal counterpart, we recomputed the 
nominal one-year forward rate for the exact horizon covered by the real forward rate on 
each date.  
 
The primary difficulty in using TIPS, and the reason that we do not rely on this approach 
earlier, is that the TIPS market has only existed for several years.  Ten-year TIPS have 
been issued every January since 1997 (and in July 2002), which allows us to compute a  24
real one-year forward rate only since January 1998.  Thus, given the limited number of 
data points, the results must be taken with caution at this point. 
 
The estimated responses to macroeconomic surprises are shown in Table 3.  Because the 
sample is shorter, we again show the response of the one-year nominal rate, which is now 
significant for 12 of the macroeconomic variables.  Six of those 12 variables also 
generate a significant response of the long-term nominal forward rate.  The response of 
the long-term nominal rate is more often generated by its inflation compensation 
component than by its real component.  Indeed, inflation compensation responds 
significantly for three of the six variables, while the real forward rate responds 
significantly in only one of the cases.  The response of forward inflation compensation is 
also significant in three other cases, while the response of the real forward rate is only 
marginally significant (with the correct sign) in one case.  Moreover, for most releases 
the point estimate of the response of the real forward rates is quite small relative to that of 
the nominal forward rate. 
 
Table 4 repeats the same exercise for the monetary policy shocks.  According to our 
estimates, the real long-term forward rate does not respond to monetary policy shocks, 
while inflation compensation responds with a significant negative coefficient.  Thus, it 
appears that the response of expected inflation drives the negative relationship between 




6.  Evidence from the U.K 
 
The evidence presented from U.S. financial markets suggests that forward rates are 
unanchored in part because the Federal Reserve does not have an absolute commitment to 
a specific inflation target.  This possibility immediately raises the question of whether 
similar behavior is observed in countries that have announced explicit targets for 
                                                 
18 Interestingly, in our short sample, the response of the nominal forward rate is insignificant, reflecting the 
positive coefficient on the real forward rate and the negative coefficient on inflation compensation.  25
inflation.  We investigate this question by looking at the response of forward rates in the 
U.K. to macroeconomic news. 
 
The U.K. adopted an inflation target in 1992, but at this time the Bank of England lacked 
independence.  The Bank of England gained operational independence in mid-1997, and 
it appears that its commitment to the specified inflation target gained credibility 
thereafter.  If this were indeed the case, we would expect to find that long-term forward 
rates in the U.K. would have reacted to macroeconomic news in the 1992-1997 period, 
but that these forward rates would have been stable since mid-1997.   
 
To test this hypothesis, we carry out an exercise for the U.K. similar to the one performed 
above using U.S. data.  In particular, we look at the response of forward rates at different 
horizons to various macroeconomic surprises.  The surprises are again computed using 
survey measures from MMS, although we restrict the analysis to a more limited set of 
macroeconomic variables.  Based on the availability of MMS data to us, our sample 
covers the period from February 1993 to August 2001. 
 
The findings are reported in Table 5.  In the pre-independence period, four of the six 
macroeconomic variables considered had a significant impact on the one-year interest 
rate.  Of those four, three of the variables also generated significant responses of the 
forward rates ending five and ten years ahead.  This finding suggests that long-term 
inflation expectations were not well anchored in the U.K. over this period.  As in the U.S. 
data, the response of forward rates occurred in response to both direct news about 
inflation, including RPI (retail price) inflation and PPI (producer price) inflation, and to 
news about the strength of aggregate demand (the preliminary GDP release). 
 
This behavior appears to have shifted in the post-independence period.  As above, we 
find that four of the variables considered have significant effects on the one-year rate, but 
now none of those four have any explanatory power for forward rates ending five or ten 
years ahead.  In other words, the expected impact on the short-term interest rate appears  26
to be transitory in response to these shocks—the pattern that one would expect to find if 
long-run inflation expectations are well anchored by the inflation target.
19 
 
Of course, such conclusions are tentative given the limited number of data points 
available to us.  Nevertheless, in combination with the evidence from U.S. financial 
markets presented above, these findings lend support to the view that variation in the 
perceived long-run inflation target of the Federal Reserve accounts for some of the excess 
sensitivity of long-term forward rates.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions and Implications 
 
This paper has presented evidence that forward rates at long horizons react significantly 
to a variety of macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises that would be expected to 
have only transitory effects on the short-term interest rate under standard macroeconomic 
models.  In particular, the empirical evidence is at odds with the modeling assumption 
that the long-run properties of the economy are constant and perfectly known by all 
agents.  We argue that the most plausible explanation for the observed term structure 
behavior is that the private sector has adjusted its expectations of the long-run level of 
inflation in response to these macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises. 
 
Such a conclusion might have important implications for the macroeconomic models 
themselves.  Not only would those models have difficulty capturing the long-run 
properties of the economy, but any misspecification of those long-run properties would 
also affect their short-run predictions as well.  For example, the models considered are 
calibrated to match the dynamics of inflation at business cycle frequencies, under the 
assumption that long-run inflation expectations are perfectly anchored.  To the extent that 
                                                 
19 Kohn (2003) compares long-term nominal forward rates in the U.S. to those in the U.K., Canada, and 
Sweden, without focusing on the responses to macroeconomic or policy news.  He also finds that the U.K. 
forward rate was quite stable since 1997—indeed, more stable than in the U.S.  However, long-term 
forward rates in Canada and Sweden, which are also inflation-targeting countries, were not as stable as 
those in the U.K.  27
this assumption is violated, the short-run dynamics of inflation would be misspecified, 
and estimates of the parameters governing those dynamics would be incorrect. 
 
Our findings may also have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy.  
Although our results suggest that inflation expectations in the U.S. have responded to 
these macroeconomic surprises, the Federal Reserve has achieved remarkable economic 
performance—and inflation expectations have fallen to very low levels—over our sample 
period.  Nevertheless, to the extent that there may be benefits to stabilizing long-run 
forward rates and inflation expectations, our results suggest that there is some scope for 
improvement.  Moreover, our results for the U.K., while based on a limited amount of 
data, seem to indicate that the central bank can help stabilize long-term forward rates and 
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Response of Forward Rates to Macroeconomic News    
                
    ---Ending 1 yr. ahead--- --- Ending 5 yr. ahead---  ---Ending 10 yr. ahead---
    Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.  
  Constant -0.14 0.08
* -0.07 0.11  -0.02 0.11
  




















  GDP (Advance)  4.04 1.39
*** 3.72 2.62 3.77 2.27
* 
  GDP (Final)  13.85 4.35
*** 8.94 7.19 9.10 8.33
  
  Hourly Earnings  6.87 3.75
* 10.50 6.45  4.54 6.52
  




  Leading Indicators  5.77 2.08
*** 2.32 2.89 2.24 3.01
  
















  PPI (Core)  2.07 1.76
  5.08 2.20
** 6.30 1.95
*** 




  Truck Sales  1.90 0.79
** -0.18 0.70  -0.15 0.81
  
  Unemployment Rate  -10.31 3.46
*** -5.08 4.78
  0.67 4.32
  
 
Huber-White standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 




    Table 2      
Response of STRIPS-based Forward Rates to Macroeconomic News 
            
  ---Ending 5 yr. Ahead--- ---Ending 10 yr. Ahead--- 
  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.  
Constant -0.04 0.19
  0.00 0.17 
  
Capacity Utilization  7.03 2.77
**  3.69 2.41 
  
Consumer Confidence  0.50 0.20
**  0.25 0.13 
** 
Consumer Credit  0.06 0.05
  0.27 0.22 
  
CPI (Core)  27.51 11.23
**  16.94 9.57 
* 
Employment Cost Index  15.47 7.79
**  24.00 5.21 
*** 
GDP (Advance)  3.72 2.64
  4.40 2.75 
 
GDP (Final)  13.90 3.95
***  17.01 4.72 
*** 
Hourly Earnings  13.99 5.55
**  5.28 6.10 
  
Initial Claims  -0.08 0.02
***  -0.02 0.03 
  
Leading Indicators  10.95 8.12
  0.81 4.64 
  
NAPM 2.20 0.43
***  1.57 0.41 
*** 
New Home Sales  0.03 0.02
*  0.03 0.01 
** 
Non-farm Payrolls  0.03 0.01
***  0.01 0.01 
  
Personal Income  -0.19 2.68
  0.70 3.97 
  
PPI (Core)  1.13 3.99
  6.93 2.88 
** 
Retail Sales  3.35 1.13
***  2.53 0.61 
*** 
Truck Sales  0.15 1.10
  0.55 0.89 
  
Unemployment Rate  -12.48 6.25
**  -2.51 6.54 
  
Huber-White standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 






                    
       Table 3             
  Response of Real Forward Rates and Inflation Compensation  
to Macroeconomic News 
                    
    --- Long-term Forward Rates ---   
 
Nominal Rate 
Ending 1 yr. 
Ahead   Nominal   Real  
Inflation 
Compensation  
                        
  Coef.  Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.   Coef. Std. Err.    Coef.  Std. Err. 
Constant  -0.31 0.14**  -0.07 0.19  0.11 0.15   -0.20 0.22 
Capacity Utilization  9.72 2.77*** 4.19 3.11  0.46 1.54   3.72 3.34 
Consumer Confidence  0.52 0.17*** 0.34 0.18*  0.00 0.14   0.34 0.15** 
Consumer Credit  0.06 0.05  0.16 0.07**  -0.09 0.08   0.24 0.09*** 
CPI (Core)  -2.25 7.64  13.36 10.41  0.22 7.95   13.06 12.24 
Employment Cost Index  15.60 2.41*** 11.74 4.67**  -3.72 3.22   15.44 4.18*** 
GDP (Advance)  4.04 1.38*** 4.16 2.26*  0.75 1.73   3.39 2.12* 
GDP (Final)  13.87 4.45*** 9.41 8.51  1.89 3.23   7.56 7.20 
Hourly Earnings  5.70 5.26  10.93 7.00  -2.04 4.94   12.97 8.42 
Initial Claims  -0.08 0.03*** -0.05 0.02**  -0.01 0.01   -0.03 0.02 
Leading Indicators  3.22 4.09  8.04 5.12  2.80 4.28   5.26 5.04 
NAPM  1.51 0.52*** 1.63 0.41*** 1.12 0.51 **  0.50 0.69 
New Home Sales  0.02 0.02  0.04 0.02**  0.00 0.01   0.04 0.02*** 
Non-farm Payrolls  0.03 0.01*** 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.01 *  -0.01 0.01 
Personal Income  2.63 2.20  3.97 2.76  1.29 2.57   2.70 3.56 
PPI (Core)  -4.02 3.80  -0.44 3.16  0.31 5.74   -1.18 7.32 
Retail Sales  8.21 1.84*** 9.90 2.13*** 1.54 1.60   9.12 2.60*** 
Truck Sales  1.93 0.89**  -0.10 0.71  -1.46 0.85 *  1.35 1.04 
Unemployment Rate  -11.80 4.95**  2.53 7.08   3.48 7.47    -0.96 8.61  
Huber-White standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 




       Table 4             
  Response of Real Forward Rates and Inflation Compensation  
to Monetary Policy Surprises 
                      
  --- Long-term Forward Rates --- 
 
Nominal Rate 
Ending 1 yr. 
Ahead  Nominal Real 
Inflation 
Compensation 
        
  Coef.  Std. Err.  Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.    Coef.  Std. Err. 
Constant -1.93  0.84 
** -0.54 0.77 0.04 0.72    -0.58  0.84 
Policy Surprise  0.36  0.17 
** -0.20 0.16 0.06 0.05    -0.25  0.12
** 
                
Obs. 39    39    39    39   
R
2 0.26 
  0.13     0.02     0.19 
  
Huber-White standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 
level.  34
 
         Table 5            
    Response of U.K. Forward Rates to Macroeconomic News   
                                   
  Pre-Independence:                  
    ---Current---  ---5 yrs. Ahead--- ---10  yrs.  Ahead---     
    Coef.  Std. Err.   Coef.  Std. Err.   Coef.  Std. Err.      
 Constant  -0.37 0.18
** -0.06 0.18  -0.01 0.20       
 PPI  (Input)  2.07 0.65
*** 1.87 1.17
* 2.26 0.95 
**   
 RPI  (Core)  -0.52  13.43  -32.31 21.94  -36.25 25.64       
 RPI  17.89 5.18
*** 22.99 5.64
*** 21.51 6.50 
***    
 Avg.  Earnings  12.79 4.44
*** 5.37 4.09 2.15 3.76       
 GDP  (Prelim)  12.56 7.64
* 13.44 4.98
*** 17.51 7.20 
**   
 Mfg.  Output  1.68 1.36  0.11 1.64  0.22 1.90       
                        
  Post-Independence:                 
    ---Current---  ---5 yrs. Ahead--- ---10  yrs.  Ahead---     
    Coef.  Std. Err.   Coef.  Std. Err.   Coef.  Std. Err.      
 Constant  -0.20 0.11
* -0.21 0.16  -0.25 0.15       
 PPI  (Input)  -0.12 0.98  -0.19 0.97  -0.51 1.15       
 RPI  (Core)  16.49 7.36
** 0.54 8.76  -3.12 6.64       
 RPI  5.19 7.57  0.61 8.52  -7.54 5.49       
 Avg.  Earnings  10.93 2.75
*** 5.26 3.68  -1.71 3.20       
 GDP  (Prelim)  13.00 3.65
*** 1.63 6.47  -6.81 8.90       
 Mfg.  Output  2.71 1.32
** 2.16 1.86  0.29 2.00       
                      
 
Huber-White standard errors.  *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% 
level, and * at the 10% level.  The estimated coefficient indicates basis point response 
per unit of the macroeconomic variable.        
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Figure 1:  Impulse Response Functions for Standard Macro Models 
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Figure 6:  Interest Rate Impulse Responses for Models with Persistent Shocks 
 
CGG Model                 Rudebusch Model 
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Interest Rate Response to 1−percent Interest Rate Shock





Interest Rate Response to 1 percent Inflation Shock





Interest Rate Response to 1 percent Output Shock



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7 (cont.):  Interest Rate Impulse Responses for Models with Time-Varying * 
(CGG Model with Persistent Shocks) 
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